|
The following article is from the SAVES newsletter, The
VE Bulletin, Vol 17 No 2, Jul 00
Legalised Voluntary Euthanasia
(LVE)
and the Common Good Argument
(CGA)
The primary objection to Legalised Voluntary Euthanasia (LVE)
comes from the religious doctrine that deliberately ending human life is
contrary to God's will and thus always wrong. It is now used less openly
because:
-
Many believers reject the doctrine when they cannot reconcile it with their
understanding of a God of love and compassion.
-
Religious belief is not admissible as an argument in a free society where
the consequences of that belief are imposed on those taking a different
view.
-
LVE is by definition permissive. There is no requirement for anyone to
become involved in any way against conscience or religious belief.
Consequently there is a tendency for opponents to pay increasing attention
to pragmatic objections, which become, in effect, secular alternatives
to claiming God to be the supreme authority in this matter. And when all
such objections have been shown to be at best of doubtful validity, when
it has been conceded, for example, that palliative care cannot adequately
relieve all suffering, the final one is that LVE is not in the "common
good". Some must suffer so that greater suffering will not befall others.
The Common Good Argument (CGA) claims LVE will lead to:
-
collapse of respect for the inherent worth of human life - leading eventually
to horrors such as the elimination of the handicapped or those said to
be undesirable or unworthy,
-
tragic errors of judgement in providing VE inappropriately, loss of trust
in our doctors because they would be thought to be free to end our lives
as they wished, and
-
failure of our legal system to protect the most vulnerable in the community.
These claims are speculative and not supported by the limited evidence
available from jurisdictions where VE and/or Medically Assisted Suicide
is, or has been openly practiced, ie, The Netherlands, Switzerland, the
Northern Territory and Oregon.
The CGA is often presented as self-evident, requiring little or no explanation
or justification. A good example of this approach is provided by the presentation
to the South Australian Parliament in October 1999 of a report on a proposed
VE Bill. The Chairperson of the parliamentary committee charged with examining
and making recommendations on the Bill made a lengthy statement which closed
as follows:
"In conclusion, I would like to repeat that the majority of committee
members are opposed to the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia and physician
assisted suicide because we do not believe that individual autonomy should
have precedence over the greater good. We also believe, in the words of
one of our witnesses , Dr Ian Olver, Clinical Director, Royal Adelaide
Hospital Cancer Centre, who has a PhD from Monash University on end of
life decisions, that:
'The idea of having rights that are absolutely paramount can apply
only if we live on a desert island and our actions affect no-one. If we
live in society, we voluntarily give up some of our rights for the good
of society.'
"Another explanation that summarised the majority view was that of Dr
Bernadette Tobin of the Plunkett Centre who, paraphrased, said:
'We recognise that in our justice system guilty people go free, but
we tolerate that because we think it would be worse for one innocent person
to be incarcerated. I think you have the same sort of thing with legalised
euthanasia. I believe it should not be legalised, but I accept that there
will be people who want their lives ended who will not have their lives
ended. That is the moral cost of keeping it illegal. I recognise that and
we should acknowledge it more than we do and try to respond to those people's
needs better but in the end I think it would be worse if we legalised it,
because we would have the corollary moral cost, which is that ... some
people will have their lives ended who should not have their lives ended.'
"In my view - and it is that of the majority - that cost is just too
great."
Unfortunately for the opponents of LVE, the CGA just does not withstand
scrutiny. Consider, for example, the arguments against LVE listed by the
Committee in their report. Of the 23 arguments listed, 7 are variations
of the CGA. (There is no religious argument on the list and no corresponding
list of arguments in support of LVE.)
The 7 CGA variations are:
-
legislation is too blunt an instrument to protect others from the (unspecified)
consequences of changing society's formal view of killing.
BUT ---- the proposed legislation does not change society's
formal view of 'killing'. Far from permitting any act of violence, it allows
for compassion and respect for individual values in prescribed circumstances
of last resort. There is no killing.
-
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to ensure that all acts of euthanasia
would be truly voluntary.
BUT ---- under present law there is nothing at all to ensure
this. Proposed legislation would require full medical documentation leading
to proper monitoring and regulation. There would be parliamentary oversight
and the opportunity to make amendments as necessary.
-
it would be impossible to protect the vulnerable, especially the frail
old, the young, the mentally and physically disabled, the poor and members
of minority groups without good access to medical services because it is
not possible to devise adequate legislative safeguards to protect the vulnerable.
BUT ---- the implication that government is incapable of legislating
to protect its citizens denigrates the authority and ability of parliament
to devise legislative responses to meet the needs of its citizens. If it
refers to families and others who would benefit in some way, eg from the
distribution of their estates or by eliminating the burden of ongoing care,
it ignores the safeguards proposed in the legislation, especially the key
role of the medical profession.
-
it would be likely that people would become inured to death and dying and
to deliberate intervention in hastening death and that this would have
deleterious effects on the whole of society.
BUT ---- on the contrary, legislation would focus attent-ion
on compassion for unwanted suffering in the incurably ill, to which people
are inured by the present law.
-
it would create a category of people whose lives were excluded from being
safeguarded because the current protection for life would be removed.
BUT ---- the assertion that 'the current protection for life
would be removed' is absurd and repeats the unfounded allegation of lack
of protection for 'the vulnerable'.
-
although compassionate support for the patient and family must continue,
for a minority of patients whose pain and suffering cannot be eased by
palliative care, the interests of the individual should not take precedence
over those of society.
BUT ---- the proposition that society is better served by denying
sufferers the choice of a distress-free death than by the current futile
prohibition is devoid of compassion, and suggests an all-too-common disregard
of the need for democratic protection of minorities.
-
it would be ill-advised to overturn the current criminal law principle
that consent of the victim was no defense to a criminal act because of
its (unspecified) effects on society.
BUT ---- there is no victim in voluntary euthanasia, nor would
it be a criminal act.
The CGA would have us accept that it is in the common good for large numbers
of compassionate doctors to continue to break the law without penalty so
that abusive or incompetent doctors will not cause their patient's deaths,
either deliberately or inadvertently. Apparently such doctors are greatly
intimidated by the absolute prohibition of VE and do not break that law.
This just does not make sense. How best to adequately control rogue doctors
is an interesting challenge but there is absolutely no reason to believe
that cases of doctor malpractice will increase with open regulation of
VE rather than with no regulation at all.
When VE legislation is enacted:
-
greater respect will be shown for the inherent worth of human life by making
provision for:
-- lawful acts of compassion towards those suffering without hope of
relief except in death, and
-- personal autonomy in decisions about VE in those circumstances.
-
trust in our doctors will be enhanced when:
-- the dying process can be discussed openly between doctor and patient
without inhibition by concerns about illegality, and
-- there are legally defined safeguards for the practice of VE reinforced
by guidelines developed within the medical profession.
-
confidence in our legal system will increase when:
-- doctors who accept that VE can be a rational option are not criminalised
for responding compassionately to a justifiable request, and
-- the practice of VE is openly monitored rather than totally concealed
as at present.
-
many of our citizens, particularly the old and frail, will be greatly relieved
to know that the option of LVE will be available to them should they be
faced with the prospect of ending their days in intolerable distress, confusion,
or total dependence on others. They will be better able to enjoy what time
they have left, which may well be longer because of their reduced anxiety.
-
there will be no need for older people who desperately want to die to choose
extreme forms of self deliverance, such as jumping off high places; nor
will they need to take such actions prematurely as a protection against
losing capability.
These are the sorts of considerations that lead to around 75% support in
the community for LVE. They are positive gains. They are all positively
in the common good. They very much outweigh speculations to the contrary.
Acknowledgement: I am indebted to Dr Harry Green and Dr Eric
Gargett for valuable suggestions in the preparation of this article.
|
|